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When Sacred Space becomes a Heritage Place:
Pilgrimage, Worship, and Tourism in Contemporary
China
Robert Shepherd

Elliott School, George Washington University.
rshepher@gwu.edu

When promoted at sites that have traditionally been religious in character, heritage
tourism evokes questions of intentionality, commodification, and authenticity. In
particular, tourism at such sites is alleged to flatten out local practices, cause social
problems, and commercialise the sacred. In short, local cultural practices are presumed
to be transformed for the worse by tourism, a presumption which implies the existence
of pristine pre-tourist cultures which can serve as baseline tools for measuring the
impact of this touristic degradation. In this paper I address these concerns by examining
tourism at a particular Chinese religious site, recently designated as a national park and
world heritage site, the Buddhist pilgrimage destination of Mount Wutai (Ch. Wutai
Shan). In 1982 the Wutai area was designated one of China’s first national parks and in
2009 was inscribed on UNESCO’s world heritage list. In the last two decades Wutai
Shan has become one of the most visited religious destinations in northern China,
primarily by citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). According to local,
provincial, and national authorities, these overwhelmingly ethnic Han Chinese visitors
are tourists, not pilgrims. Although the extent to which they identify as Buddhists is
unclear, religious practice is widespread among visitors. Moreover, this practice is not
hidden, since the state is very much present at Wutai Shan. State heritage policies at the
site are designed to protect this as a heritage space, and thus, align with broad UNESCO
preservation goals, particularly spatial arrangements. However, unlike UNESCO, local,
provincial, and national authorities do not view tourism as a threat to the ‘heritage’ of
Wutai Shan. Instead, by eliminating (as a direct effect of UNESCO management
recommendations) a vibrant informal local economy structured around pilgrimage, state
officials (particularly provincial and local officials), aim to ‘clean up’ this space, spur
tourism, and capture a significant share of the resulting revenues. The net result is a
situation in which state policies simultaneously enable mass tourism, manage religious
practice, and seek to guide visitor experiences. What remains is not a sacred place
somehow ruined by tourism and / or commodification, but a quotidian religious space at
which the thick happenings of Buddhism-in-practice have been curtailed but not
eliminated. In short, the enactment of this sacred place remains, albeit under the careful
gaze of various parts of the state.
Key Words: Wutai Shan, heritage, tourism, Buddhism, UNESCO

Introduction
When promoted at sites that have traditionally rbeen
religious in character, heritage tourism evokes
questions of intentionality (both of destination
producers and visitors), commodification, and
authenticity.
Indeed,
concerns
about
the
commercialisation of cultural sites and events by
tourism have circulated within tourism studies from the
field’s earliest years (see Greenwood, 1977; Cohen,
1988; MacCannell, 1992). For several decades critics
have argued that, while tourism may encourage a
renewed interest in traditional arts and social practices
~ 34 ~

among local craftsmen and others, tourist purchases are
fuelled by a desire to possess a mark, rather than out of
any genuine interest in local cultural traditions or
beliefs (Mathieson and Wall, 1982:165-169). This lack
of genuine interest may, according to critics, induce
some local residents, pressured to assume the idealised
identities which tourists expect, to ‘become other,’
resulting in an encounter defined by ‘reciprocal
misconstructions’ (Lanfant, 1995:35-36), or what Dean
MacCannell (1994) has called the ‘postmodern
emptiness’ of (commodified) cultural performance (see
also Brunner, 1995; Linnekin, 1997:216). As a result,
given a monetary value, ritual and tradition become
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valueless for local inhabitants (Harrison, 1994:243244). In its extreme form, this argument describes a
process of ‘McDonaldization’ and ‘Disneyfication’ that
transforms heritage sites into spaces that resemble
theme parks, and makes other, presumably more
authentic travel experiences impossible (Ritzer and
Liska, 1997:97-101).
The commercialisation of local cultural practices and
social relationships as a result of tourism is also
blamed for social problems such as drug abuse, petty
crime, environmental degradation, prostitution, and a
decline in social stability (McLaren, 1998:28). In short,
(local) cultural practices are presumed to be
transformed, for the worse, by contact with tourism, a
presumption which implies the existence of pristine pre
-tourist cultures which serve as baseline tools for
measuring the impact of this touristic degradation
(Hitchcock et.al., 1993:8; Wood, 1993:63).
In this paper, I address these concerns by examining
tourism at a particular Chinese religious site recently
designated as a national park and world heritage site the Buddhist pilgrimage destination of Mount Wutai
(Ch. Wutai Shan). Wutai Shan has been one of the
most important Buddhist sites in East Asia for
centuries, drawing pilgrims from China, Tibet,
Mongolia, Nepal, India, and Japan. In 1982 Wutai
Valley was designated one of China’s first national
parks and in 2009 was inscribed on UNESCO’s world
heritage list. In the last two decades Wutai Shan has
become one of the most visited religious destinations in
northern China, attracting approximately four million
annual visitors in 2012 (GOC, 2011), the vast majority
of whom are citizens of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). According to local, provincial, and national
authorities, these overwhelmingly ethnic Han Chinese
visitors are tourists, not pilgrims. Yet other than
temples, monasteries, and pilgrimage trails, the area
offers visitors little diversion. What draws millions of
people to Wutai Shan each year if they do not worship
Buddha (baifo)? Is this a case of a once-sacred place
that has been ‘Disneyfied’ by mass tourism? In other
words, is this yet another example of the corroding
effects tourism is supposed to have on the sacred and
authentic?
At least in this case, the answer is no. At Wutai Shan,
religious practice is widespread among visitors,
although the extent to which most visitors identify as
Buddhists is questionable. Moreover, this practice is
not hidden, since the state is very much present at
Wutai Shan. This includes officials from the State
Administration of Cultural Heritage, the Ministry of
~ 35 ~

Tourism, the Religious Affairs Commission, the
Ministry of Housing and Rural Development, and the
National Forest Administration, among others. State
heritage policies at Wutai Shan are designed to protect
this site as a heritage space, and thus, align with broad
UNESCO preservation goals, particularly spatial
arrangements. However, unlike UNESCO, local,
provincial, and national authorities do not view tourism
as a threat to the ‘heritage’ of Wutai Shan. Instead, by
eliminating (as a direct effect of UNESCO
management recommendations) a vibrant informal
local economy structured around pilgrimage, state
officials (particularly provincial and local officials),
aim to ‘clean up’ this space, spur tourism, and capture
a significant share of the resulting revenues. The net
result is a situation in which state policies
simultaneously enable mass tourism, manage religious
practice, and seek to guide visitor experiences. What
remains is not a sacred place somehow ruined by
tourism or commodification, but a quotidian religious
space at which the thick happenings of Buddhism-inpractice (such as noise, smells, gambling, soothsaying,
buying, selling, chatting, singing, dozing, and sundry
other activities), actions that revolve around temples
and monasteries, have been curtailed but not
eliminated. In short, the enactment of this sacred place
remains, albeit under the careful gaze of various parts
of the state. If for UNESCO the notion of world
heritage signifies particular cultural landscapes that
speak to and hence symbolically belong to a universal
audience, this specific world heritage site illustrates an
ongoing Chinese state effort to rationalise and
formalise social practices (such as worship) that may
be neither ‘rational’ nor formal. What remains is not
staged performance, but worship-in-practice that is
supposed to be cleansed of informality and ambiguity.

To Categorise or Not to Categorise
Visitors? A Note on Typology
In the early years of tourism studies, a good deal of
work began with the question of intentionality as a
stepping stone to determining which types of tourists
were engaged in either a search for or the practice of
authentic travel (see McCannell, 1976; Cohen, 1988;
Greenwood, 1977). This desire to delineate resulted in
various attempts to chart and classify the experiences
and practices of travellers in contrast to tourists, with
the former typically framed as active seekers of
meaning and the latter as passive observers of staged
performances (see E. Cohen, 1979; Richards and
Wilson, 2004; S. Cohen, 2010). Among these
researchers, Erik Cohen has been one of the most
influential. In his first foray into typologies, he
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classified tourists as ‘drifters,’ ‘explorers,’ ‘individual
mass tourists,’ and ‘group mass tourists’ (Cohen,
1972). In his later work, he posited five categories of
tourists, ranging from ‘recreational’ and ‘diversionary’
travellers who had no concern with authenticity to
‘experiential,’ ‘experimental’ and ‘existential’ tourists,
of whom the latter, he argued, seek the most profound
and deepest experiences (1988:377). This typological
approach has continued to be commonplaces. For
example, in her discussion of British tourists at beach
destinations in Greece, Wickens (2002) categorises
tourists as heritage seekers, ‘ravers’ (hedonists),
‘Shirley Valentines’ (British women seeking a Greek
man for romance), ‘heliolatrous’ (sun worshippers),
and ‘Lord Byrons’ (Grecophiles).
These attempts to situate the particularities of tourism
experiences into broad categories raise several issues.
First, such an approach assumes that tourists actually
can be classified into distinct categories. In the above
example, might a British female tourist not only
engage in a short term sexual relationship with a local
Greek man (or vice-versa) while on vacation, but also
spend time sunning on a beach, partying at night,
visiting cultural sites on rainy days, and returning in
the future to do this all over again? In other words,
classifying tourists by mono-intentionality ignores the
broad spectrum of everyday tourist behaviour. People
engage in a range of activities while on vacation. In
short, monolithic categories leak.
A second question about typologies is the implicit
ranking of types that follows from initial assumptions
of what tourists should do. According to MacCannell
(1976), the touristic quest is a search for one’s
authentic self, a quest which, according to Erik Cohen,
is a search for what has not yet been tainted by
modernity (1988:374). If we assume this search is the
point of tourism, the hierarchy implied among Cohen’s
five tourist types seems quite logical: from those who
are completely unreflective and focus solely on
physical pleasure to existentialists who are profoundly
aware of the alienating effects of modernity. Or, to
quote Cohen:
those who are disposed to reflect upon their life
situation are more aware of their alienation
than those who do not tend to such
contemplation (1988:376).
In other words, to not feel alienated indicates a
misrecognition of one’s own self-alienation.
This claim presumes that residents of complex, modern
societies are in fact alienated from their authentic
selves. It thus, is a circular argument: the modern
~ 36 ~

condition is defined by alienation, so if a member of a
modern society does not recognise his or her own
alienation this confirms said alienation. In form this
logic mirrors the false consciousness argument
employed by Marxists to explain why many workers in
industrialised societies do not acknowledge their own
exploitation and thus alienation. What both these
approaches share is a hegemonic belief that some
people (such as academic researchers and Marxist
theorists) are privy to a more accurate realisation of
reality. To disagree with this view demonstrates one’s
own inability to reflect on and critically analyse reality.
But why assume a tourist needs to be alienated in order
to have a fulfilling travel experience? This only makes
sense if we first accept the questionable logic that
someone’s authentic self is located not at home but on
the road, among strangers. In other words, if we
assume that modern life is inherently alienating, and if
we accept the premise that the less-modern is the site
of authentic being, tourists who do not settle for
surface experiences and the comforts of modernity are
logically more correct in their choices. Indeed, these
appear to be qualitatively better choices. Moreover,
those who do settle for less do so because they delude
themselves,
not
being
‘aware
of
their
alienation’ (Cohen 1988:376).
This perspective is nothing more than a return to the
cliché of ‘the traveller,’ that heroic Western archetype,
the he-who-is-not-a-tourist standing in opposition to
the always-worked upon ‘tourist.’ As I have argued
elsewhere (Shepherd, 2002; 2003; 2015), selfidentifying travellers are still tourists, they are simply
tourists who frame and filter their experiences through
a subjective lens of not identifying as tourists (see also
Stausberg, 2011). However, this traveller narrative is
not reducible to a ‘Western’ condition. To do so reifies
a different dichotomy, the ‘East’ in contrast to the
‘West.’ This assumes a monolithic Western condition,
when it in actuality reflects the values and perspectives
of a specific class of people (those who believe
alienation is part and parcel of the condition of
Modernity).
Of course, one might say this discussion is no longer
relevant in an era of postmodern tourism.
Constructivists point out that people travel for a
multitude of reasons (Collins-Kreiner, 2010; Digance,
2006; Maoz and Beckerman, 2010), and even at a
religious site, ostensibly faith-driven visitors engage in
a range of behaviours. They may pray, travel along a
pre-determined route, visit a set number of shrine-like
destinations, and yet also eat well, shop for souvenirs,
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and, broadly speaking, have fun, thereby collapsing
distinctions between secular and religious, serious and
playful, contemplation and entertainment. According to
Collins-Kreiner (2010), ‘no place is intrinsically
sacred’ (2010:444), ‘each person may interpret his or
her own experience differently’ (448) and
consequently, ‘issues of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ seem less
important in the post-modern world, and may not even
exist’ (450). This is a view endorsed by Maoz and
Beckerman (2010:436), who reject any distinctions
between pilgrims and tourists. Oakes and Sutton (2010)
suggest that tourist and pilgrim intentions overlap, as
pilgrims also act as tourists while some tourists may
engage in religious practices. The logical endpoint of
this perspective rejects any distinction between secular
and religious travel, asserting that any journey that is
‘redolent with [personal] meaning’ can be classified as
a pilgrimage (Digance, 2006:36). Thus, a wide variety
of travel actions which are not formally religious can
nevertheless serve a sacred-like purpose (Badone &
Roseman, 2004:2).

between a destination valued for its cosmological
significance and one valued for other reasons, it also
erases the very notion of sacred space (Timothy and
Olsen 2006): when everything is equally valuable
nothing is sacred. Moreover, a questioning of abstract
categories does not mean that differences do not in fact
exist among visitors to religious sites (Eade & Sallnow
1991). For a place to be sacred, whether in a religious
sense (such as Varanasi in India or Lourdes in France)
or a secular sense (such as Graceland in Memphis or,
say, the American baseball Hall of Fame in
Cooperstown, New York), one must understand and
experience this sacredness (Bremer 2006).

Tourism at Religious Sites
What then of tourism and religion, or more to the
point, tourism at religious sites, in China? Zhang Mu
and his colleagues describe religious tourism as,

I fully recognise and accept the critique of typologies
and the ambiguity of intentionality. But I do see value
in recognising that visitors to, in this case study, a site
that has been a sacred destination for centuries, may
engage in a range of behaviours while having a
primary intention. For example, some visitors to
religious sites in any society are undoubtedly
motivated by supernatural goals, desires, or intentions
(Eade and Sallnow, 1991). This raises the issue of the
relationship between the intentions of visitors and the
purposes of a (religious) site. At a site that is
considered sacred space for very specific and exclusive
reasons, do the intentions of all visitors have equal
standing or even relevancy? Or does the sacredness of
a site serve as a stopping point for personal
intentionality? In this case study, Wutai Shan is not
sacred because it is the location of certain temples and
monasteries; it is sacred because the landscape has
been believed to be the home of Manjusri, the
Bodhisattva of Wisdom, by Buddhists in the East
Asian region, since at least the Fifth Century CE. In
other words, the religious material culture which
UNESCO has classified as world heritage is not the
source of Wutai Shan’s aura; these buildings affirm an
already-present sacred landscape (and in the process
add to the sacredness of the landscape).

a special tourist activity orientated by religious
culture with the help of a specific eco-cultural
environment (2007: 101).
They also assert that most Han Chinese do not believe
in a deity or practice religion, and therefore, visit
historic pilgrimage sites such as the Buddhist
mountains of Ermei Shan in Sichuan and Wutai Shan
in Shanxi for cultural and historical reasons. These
visitors are thus, ‘cultural pilgrims’ (ibid:105).
Similarly, Zhang Cheng (2002), while agreeing that the
number of Han Chinese visitors to religious sites has
grown in China, suggests that contemporary Chinese
tourists do not practice religion when they tour these
sites. Finally, religious destinations in the PRC,
particularly Buddhist sites that attract an ethnic crosssection of visitors including Han, Meng (Mongolian)
and Zang (Tibetan), are described by national tourism
authorities as ‘religious-cultural tourism’ (zongjiao
wenhua luyou). For example, according to official
statistics, religious devotees constitute less than ten
percent of the annual tourist arrivals at Wutai Shan.
The most comprehensive data on visitor arrivals,
compiled for Wutai Shan’s world heritage nomination
application in 2007, estimated that 59,400 of a total of
575,000 arrivals in August 2006, the busiest tourist
month in the PRC, were religious pilgrims (GOC,
2008a:233). In conversations with a local official in
2010, I was told that only one in eight visitors came for
religious reasons. The rest were tourists, he explained.

An erasure of all differences between pilgrims and
tourists rests on an anthropologically thin basis (see
Stausberg, 2011). First of all, to characterise a
pilgrimage site as any place to which people travel (see
Digance, 2006) not only negates any differences

These data support the claim that few Han Chinese
practice religion. From this perspective, tourists visit
Wutai Shan not because it is sacred but because it is an
historical and cultural destination that demonstrates the
country’s unified multi-ethnic basis. From a national
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state perspective, increased tourism is desirable, since
this will further a national campaign of
‘civilisation’ (wenming) and educate visitors. Local
and provincial authorities support increased tourism
which will spur development and generate revenues.
Both perspectives are quite different from that of
UNESCO and related institutions such as the
International Committee on Monuments and Sites
(ICOMOS), which consider sites such as Wutai Shan
to be parts of a collective world heritage that require
protection from, broadly speaking, modernisation. In
this particular case state development policies that have
sought to expand the domestic tourism industry for not
just political and economic reasons but also what is
termed in Chinese as ‘spiritual’ (jingshen) concerns.
Heritage, be this religious or otherwise, is part and
parcel of a broader state-directed campaign to cultivate
and boost the spiritual[1] basis of development, thereby
balancing out material (wuzhi) development and
increasing the civilisational level of the Chinese Nation
(Shepherd, 2012).

The ‘Spiritual’ in Revolutionary China
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China in October 1949, both tourism and pilgrimage
effectively ended. Led by Mao Zedong, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) aimed to reorder not only the
(material) means of production but also the moral basis
of citizens. This in turn required a spatial reordering of
urban residents into work units and peasants into
communes (Anagnost, 1994).
The primary objective of work units was to replace the
foundational role family ties had played in Chinese
society for thousands of years with a new form of
community, a fully rationalised, organised, and
planned micro-society that simultaneously displaced
preferential kin ties and turned social relationships into
an aspect of economic production (Bray, 2005:96).
Work units provided members with food, clothing,
housing, education, and employment, functioned as the
primary social web for members, and served as a
foundational aspect of identity (Leung, 2000:618).
They also were the primary (and for most people, the
only) source of travel, in the form of collective annual
vacations. At the height of socialism in China, tourism
as an individual activity became impossible. All hotels,
restaurants, and forms of transportation were stateowned, and official letters were required to access
these services.
1. This Chinese notion of ‘spiritual’ does not reflect any
cosmological linkage but rather a sense of ‘Chineseness.’ It thus describes an ethno-moral aspect of personal
character.
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In retrospect, urban work units and rural communes
were as much pedagogical tools as they were political
institutions, designed not just to control citizens
spatially but also to shape them morally. Paradoxically,
while aimed at undermining kin ties (the social glue of
Confucianism) this social structure used the
foundational premise of Confucianism (that all people
can be improved through a combination of social
modelling and self-cultivation) as a key organising
principle. This was combined with Mao’s believe that
the collective will power of society could enable China
to literally leap through material stages of development
and thereby achieve authentic communism without
passing through a capitalist stage.
Although the reform period in China began in 1978,
work unit culture only began to be dismantled after
1989. Housing is now private, people can change their
jobs at will, and travel is a matter of money and not
state permission. Most importantly, social and
economic changes have eroded any belief in
communism, creating a space for religious faith while
raising questions about the role of the CCP. In short, if
the Chinese Communist Party no longer advocates
communism in practice, what is the ideological
justification for its rule?
The CCP has responded to this legitimacy dilemma by
jettisoning
Mao’s
profoundly
non-Marxist
interpretation of the relationship between a society’s
base and superstructure (Anagnost, 1997:84). Mao had
rejected the fundamental Marxist point that a society’s
material base (its stage of development) determined its
social development (its superstructure), instead arguing
that the collective will of Chinese people could
transform the base itself, thus fast-tracking China’s
advance towards communism. After gaining power in
1979, Deng Xiaoping shifted the political focus away
from class struggle towards general prosperity
(xiaokang shehui), based on material and spiritual
civilisation (jingshen wenming). That is to say, while
he radically transformed the economic basis of Chinese
society by embracing (limited) private market action,
he did not intend to allow market forces to shape social
and moral behaviour. Deng thus, was as much a
heretical Marxist as was Mao. While Mao had
attempted to use the superstructure to transform the
base, Deng sought to prevent the base from
transforming the superstructure.
Importantly, ‘spiritual’ as used in Chinese does not
connote the supernatural, paranormal, or Godly. It
instead signifies ethical and moral attributes that
characterise right-thinking and right-acting citizens and
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is thus more akin to the English language concept of
‘virtuous’ (Kipnis, 2006). Deng’s approach thus
echoed late nineteenth century reformers who
advocated using foreign technology and products while
maintaining a (presumed) Chinese cultural essence
(Dynon, 2008:86). For example, Deng began the first
‘Spiritual Civilization Campaign’ (jingshen wenhua
yundong) in 1982, which promoted public morality
(gongde), patriotism (aiguo zhuyi), culture (wenhua),
discipline (jilu), and ideals (lixiang).
A second Spiritual Civilization Campaign was
launched in 1996 by Jiang Zemin, the former party
leader of Shanghai who rose to power in the wake of
the Tiananmen Square violence in the spring of 1989.
Whereas Deng’s 1982 campaign had at least made a
pro forma recognition of the role of collectivisation in
Chinese society, Jiang’s 1996 campaign replaced the
language of socialism with that of cultural nationalism
(Dynon, 2008:93). In 1997 the State Council, China’s
highest body, established the Central Commission for
Building Spiritual Civilization (zhongyang jingshen
weming jianshe zhidao weiyuanwei). It was given three
responsibilities: improving technical aspects of life,
increasing public awareness of the law, and promoting
physical fitness and hygiene. More broadly, however,
this commission was tasked with overseeing the
‘cultural engineering’ (wenhua gongcheng) of society
(Tomba, 2009:606).
This civilization campaign has both an Enlightenment
and Confucianist base, which reflects the more than
one hundred year-long debate among Chinese
intellectuals across the political spectrum about how to
be simultaneously modern and Chinese. Wenming
(civilization) is not actually a Chinese word but a
cultural borrowing from Meiji Japan (Friedman, 2004).
Like its Japanese equivalent bunmei, wenming has two
distinct connotations, one spiritual and the other
material (Anagnost, 1997). For the former, wenming
refers to what is often described by state officials as
well as Han Chinese citizens as a unified history of
thousands of years, making China unique in the world.
But this term also describes an always-becoming civil
society that signals not an unbroken historical narrative
but an emerging present and future rooted in the flux of
modernity. This is a starkly different view of society
than imagined by European and American proponents
of ‘civil society.’ Proponents of the latter perspective
believe that a civil society (a society filled with nonstate organisations) is needed to check the power of the
state, promote ethnic, racial, and social tolerance, and
eventually encourage the development of material
security for its members. The Chinese term wenming,
~ 39 ~

in contrast, signifies a society of productive, socially
responsible, and increasingly self-disciplined citizens,
who understand the need to check their individual
behaviour, so as to assist state leaders with the
development of a materially and spiritually modern
society (Friedman, 2004:691). Wenming thus
communicates both a historical basis of development
and a contemporary sense of what it means to be
modern and Chinese.
This ideal civil society is guided by the moral
attributes of suzhi (quality) and wenhua (culture). Until
the late 1970s suzhi conveyed a sense of in-born
character, in contrast to suyang, one’s embodied or
learned character. Used in this sense, a person’s bad
character might be blamed on either family
background or a lack of education. However, with the
imposition of a national one-child policy in 1978 suzhi
was re-defined and assiduously promoted by state
authorities as not an in-born attribute, but a broader
qualitative measurement of social worth as embodied
by a person’s relative development (Kipnis, 2006:299300). Those who possess a high level of suzhi possess
proper (physical) health, (mental) intelligence, and
(moral) character, attributes that have Maoist and
Confucianist foundations as well as self-cultivation
practices such tai qi, qigong, and wushu (Jacka, 2009).
‘Quality’ and ‘culture’ are not just key words of the
Party but just as importantly of an emerging middle
class and affluent elite. This is because the peasantry
and working class are no longer viewed as models of
ideological correctness and social awareness, as during
the Maoist era, but different from ‘higher quality’
citizens. This repositioning of the middle and upper
classes as role models for advancement is a sharp
break from the class politics of Mao’s era, when
anyone with kin ties to intellectuals, capitalists, or the
petty bourgeoisie experienced ostracism or worse. But,
in today’s China, being civil and civilized is a matter
of education, social standing, and wealth, not of
revolutionary credentials (Anagnost, 1997:86). In other
words, the vanguard of a future society of material
affluence, social stability, and proper moral character
is no longer the working class and peasantry but the
emerging bourgeoisie.
Far from being either the enemy of the people or the
Communist Party, this emerging class of middle and
upper class elites is of crucial importance in the
construction of what the Party defines as a Chinese
modern society. Moreover, rather than contesting a
state and CCP focus on cultivating civilization and
lifting the quality of the masses, many emerging elites
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share this goal (Nyiri, 2006:88). But what role does
religion have in this? At a time when the Communist
Party has officially postponed communism while
remaining atheistic, has faith returned to the quotidian?

Pilgrimages and Tourists in China
Pilgrimage has been practiced by Buddhists and
Daoists in China for centuries. People historically have
travelled to sacred destinations for a variety of reasons,
ranging from formal obligations for rulers and dynastic
officials and contemplative experience for the literati
during the dynastic era, to everyday acts such as
penance, health, and future prosperity for commoners
(Naquin & Yu, 1992). Chinese pilgrimage practices
have a shared affinity for a particular type of
destination, mountains believed to possess a
charismatic aura that is independent of built space.
This is reflected in the Chinese term for pilgrimage,
chaoshan jinxiang, ‘to bring incense and pay respects
to a (sacred) mountain’ (shortened to chaoxiang to
refer to pilgrims) (ibid:11-12).
By the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), four Buddhist
mountains had been identified and transformed into
pilgrimage destinations:

• in the north, Wutai Shan (Shanxi Province);
• in the west, Emei Shan (Sichuan);

• in the east, Putao Shan (Zhejiang), and;
• in the south, Jiuhua Shan (Anhui).
However, these destinations served different purposes
for different groups. The literary elite visited sacred
mountains not so much to pray as to appreciate nature
and history by experiencing ‘scenic spots’ (jingdian),
destinations marked by artists, poets, and former rulers
(Nyiri, 2006:12-13). For centuries, lay people have
visited sacred mountains for reasons of health,
penance, and prosperity, while Tibetan and Mongolian
Buddhist monks and nuns have done so to pray and
make merit. In contrast, Chan (Zen) Buddhist monks
historically were not supposed to carry out pilgrimages
to specific sacred sites but instead, to wander between
these sites.
The phenomenon of wandering monks as well as
religious tourism has re-emerged in the last two
decades as state control over mobility has decreased.
The main government and Party concern with Buddhist
religious practitioners, as with followers of other faiths,
is political stability: as long as they avoid political
issues and do not pose a threat to the government or
CCP, they are largely left alone. A case in point is the
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saga of movements in the early 1990s that were loosely
affiliated with Buddhism such as Zhong Gong and
Falun Gong. At their height these groups attracted
millions of followers and generated enormous sums of
money, but were banned and suppressed when they
were perceived to threaten the interests and paramount
role of the Communist Party. In contrast to these
groups, religious practitioners who studiously avoid
political questions are largely left alone. Indeed,
Buddhism in general and Tibetan Buddhism in
particular have boomed in recent years, both in rural
and urban areas.
In urban bookstores, religious publications ranging
from Buddhist and Daoist classics to spiritual guides
by prominent monks are just as common as titles in the
rapidly expanding field of self-help and selfdevelopment, which promise their readers efficient
ways of raising their personal quality (suzhi).
Meanwhile, a ‘Tibet craze’ (xizang) among urban
sophisticates that began in the years after 1989 shows
no sign of slowing. Tibet as a symbol of simplicity,
nature, folk wisdom, and esoteric Buddhism, serves as
a backdrop for advertisers selling beer, bottled water,
and healthy foods, while Han musicians and artists
reproduce these images in their work. Tibet-themed
shops sell ethnic jewellery, clothing, and handbags in
upscale shopping areas of Beijing, Shanghai, and other
coastal cities. No longer are Tibetans characterised as
materially backward, morally suspect, and victims of
feudal superstitions. Nor is it necessarily the duty of
Han Chinese to modernise Tibetans. Tibetans are now
‘magical’ and ‘mysterious,’ no longer simply
‘superstitious.’
It is tempting to explain this transformation of Tibetans
from primitive threat to mystical ‘Other’ among urban
Chinese sophisticates as an appropriation of
Orientalising Euro-American stereotypes about Tibet
and Tibetans, mirroring what Michel-Rolph Trouillot
(2003) has termed anthropology’s ‘savage slot.’
However, this reimagining of Tibet and Tibetan
Buddhism also reflects a return to a historical
trajectory that has linked Tibet with China religiously
and culturally since the Tang Dynasty (618-8907 CE),
especially during the Yuan (1271-1368 CE) and Qing
(1644-1912 CE) eras (Tuttle 2005:222). Moreover, the
most important Tibetan Buddhist site in mainland
China outside of Tibet is Wutai Shan. This was
recently illustrated by the announcement that the
current Dalai Lama would like to visit this area, as did
several of his predecessors, most notably the
Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who stayed at the Pusa Temple
in Taihui during a pilgrimage tour in 1908.

Shepherd

When Sacred Space becomes a Heritage Place: Pilgrimage, Worship, and Tourism in Contemporary China

Situating Wutai Shan
Wutai Shan (literally ‘the mountain of five peaks’) is
located in central Shanxi Province, approximately three
hundred and fifty kilometres southwest of Beijing. The
Wutai area is a short distance from the Mongolian
steppe and roughly equidistance between the cities of
Datong, two hundred kilometres to the north and
Taiyuan, two hundred and forty kilometres to the
south. While the elevation in the centre of the valley at
the monastery town of Taihui is approximately 1,100
meters, the surrounding peaks reach over 3,000 meters,
making these the highest mountains in northern China.
Wutai Shan was one of the PRC’s first national parks
(1982) and forest preserves (1992), and was added to
UNESCO’s world heritage list in 2009. Wutai National
Park, which encompasses the entire valley, receives
approximately 2.6 million visitors each year, almost all
of whom are domestic residents.
The sacred aura of the Wutai area predates the
introduction of Buddhism to China in the third century
CE. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), the
area was popular among Daoists as a refuge and
retreat. In the fourth century, the rulers of the northern
Wei Dynasty (386-534 BCE) constructed several
temples in the area dedicated to the Bodhisattva
Manjusri (Ch. Wenshu Shuli), and by the late Tang
Dynasty (618-907) Wutai Shan, also known as
Qingliang Shan, had become a major pilgrimage site
for Buddhists throughout East Asia (Chou, 2007:108).
This history illustrates not so much the sacralisation of
Wutai Shan, as its identification, first by Daoists and
later by Buddhists, as a place that possessed a sacred
aura.
In the late thirteenth century the Mongolian leader
Kublai Khan, founder of the Yuan Dynasty (12711368), introduced Tibetan Buddhism to the area. This
Tibetan presence later was expanded under the
patronage of the Manchurian Qing Dynasty (16441911), particularly the Kangxi Emperor (reigned 16611722) and his grandson the Qianglong Emperor
(reigned 1735-1799). During this long period of
political stability and economic prosperity, Qing
administrators poured resources into Wutai Shan and
patronised the Gelukpa School of Tibetan Buddhism.
In 1659 Tibetan Buddhists were granted control of the
major religious sites at Wutai and in 1705 the Kangxi
Emperor decreed that all ten Mahayana monasteries at
Wutai be converted to Tibetan Buddhism (Kohle,
2008:78). Subsequently, these monasteries were
directly funded by the imperial court during Qianlong’s
reign (GOC, 2008(a):117).
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In addition to official recognition and funding, Wutai
Shan also became an Imperial destination. For
example, between 1683 and 1710 Emperor Kangxi
visited the valley five times. The role of Wutai was
thus similar to that of the northeastern city of Jehol
(Chengde), site of an extensive summer palace and
temple complex built during the reigns of Kangxi and
Qianlong. Occasional imperial visits to Wutai were
replaced after 1710 by annual visits to Jehol. Wutai
Shan and Jehol served dual purposes, as links between
the Manchurian rulers and China’s imperial past and as
sites that symbolically marked the differences between
the (Manchurian) Qing and their Chinese subjects.
Consequently, the Wutai religious economy flourished
during the Qing era. At the time of the 1911
Nationalist Revolution, the valley was home to more
than forty major temples and monasteries and several
hundred lesser sites, including temples, caves, and
shrines sacred to Han Chinese, Mongolians, and
Tibetans, scattered in a radius of several hundred
kilometres.
The 1911 Revolution had little material impact on
Wutai Shan, in part because of its relative isolation.
Direct funding from the court, however, ended.
Monasteries adapted to these changes by seeking
increased and more elaborate donations from pilgrims,
especially those coming from Mongolia and Tibet.
During the war with Japan (1937-1945) and the
Chinese civil war (1945-1949) the Wutai valley
suffered little damage. After the 1949 establishment of
the People’s Republic, the new government initially
placed monasteries and temples in the valley under
state protection and allowed worship to continue.
However, during the collapse of state authority in the
Cultural Revolution, monks were beaten, evicted and
in some cases killed, and temples and monasteries
were attacked and damaged by Red Guards. It was
only in the late 1980s that monasteries and temples
were allowed to reopen, albeit under strict government
control.
Wutai Shan was decreed a national scenic spot
(jingdian) and national park by the State Council in
1982 and a national forest preserve in 1992. In 1997 it
was listed as one of the top thirty-five ‘elite attractions’
in China by the National Tourism Bureau and in 1998
designated a civilised scenic spot (wenming jingdian)
by the Shanxi Provincial government, which also
issued a master plan for development of the area. The
entire valley was added to China’s tentative list of
UNESCO heritage sites in 2001.
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This initial application for world heritage status did not
discuss Wutai Shan’s role as a pilgrimage site for
Buddhist religious practice. Instead, the nomination
report stressed its geological importance, unique
ecology, value as a meteorological research site, role as
a guerrilla base during the anti-Japanese War (19371945), and historical contribution to Chinese
Buddhism. In terms of the latter, the nomination file
emphasised the historical, artistic, and scientific merits
of the site, not religious practice (UNESCO 2010b). In
fact, religious practice was not mentioned at all. This
reflects the Chinese state narrative that religion is a
historical practice that will eventually disappear
through a continued process of social evolution and a
UNESCO emphasis on material culture as heritage.
A revised master plan issued in 2005 divided the
national park into four zones centred on Taihuai town,
location of the most important monasteries and
temples. The plan also called for the resettlement of
most local residents outside the park boundaries (GOC,
2008b:240-241). After this plan was approved by the
Government of China and UNESCO officials, Wutai
was formally nominated for world heritage status in
March 2008 (GOC, 2008a:35). References to the
political importance of Wutai for the Communist Party
as a revolutionary site were eliminated. However, these
were not replaced by a more prominent focus on
Buddhism but instead an emphasis on the area’s
cultural and natural attributes. For example, the
nomination file states that temples and monasteries
demonstrate not the importance of Wutai Shan as a
Buddhist pilgrimage site but ‘Chinese ancient building
techniques and art’ while Buddhist statues ‘display
Chinese people’s genius in art’ (Ibid:14). Pilgrimage,
the primary reason for people to visit this area for
centuries, is mentioned, but only in passing and only
then as a practice of foreign Buddhists and local
Tibetans and Mongolians, not Han Chinese (GOC,
2008a:27). Instead of Buddhist pilgrimage practices,
the nomination report highlights Wutai Shan’s
geological and biological characteristics (ibid:18-34).
Recent history, particularly Chinese Communist Party
policies that prohibited religious practice under Mao,
are noticeably absent from both this nomination report
and the UNESCO evaluation of this application. The
UNESCO evaluation report noted that,
Mount Wutai declined through social instability
[during the last years of the Qing Dynasty and
the Republican period (1911-1949), but] since
1949 and the founding of the People’s Republic
of China, efforts have been directed at reviving
and protecting the buildings (UNESCO,
2009:4).
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While this report suggests that Wutai National Park is
a cultural and historical site akin to an open-air
museum, or a natural site similar to Jiuzhaigou in
Sichuan, or Yellowstone in Wyoming, USA, the reality
is quite different. The valley currently has 47
functioning monasteries and temples, representing both
Mahayana and Tibetan Buddhism. According to
official data, approximately 2,500 Buddhist monks and
nuns live within the park boundaries (GOC,
2008a:234). This is the largest official concentration of
Buddhist monks and nuns in China outside of Tibet.

Tourism and Faith at Wutai Shan
As noted above, official data suggest that few visitors
to Wutai National Park have religious intentions. Yet,
the temples inside the park are typically crowded with
people worshipping Buddha (baifo) through kneeling,
praying, bowing, and burning incense. Are local
officials deliberately seeking to deceive by
misreporting intentions? If so, for what purpose would
they do so? And just whom would they seek to
deceive?
This is an example of how visitor categories are
culturally constructed. In this particular case, there is
no reliable way for either national park or local
government officials to know precisely why people
visit Wutai Shan. This is because there is no national
park entry form with a box to tick showing a reason for
visiting. Instead, visitors enter a welcome hall, buy
tickets, and pass through electronic turnstiles that count
the raw number of arrivals. While registration forms
must be filled out at hotels in and around the park,
these do not ask the specific intentions of visitors.
Hence there is no accurate way to calculate who is
visiting for what reasons, except by relying on the
popular discourse of religion in China: Mongolians and
Tibetans (because of their ethnicity), and Han Chinese
who publicly mark themselves as religious (by
donning the robes of monks and nuns and shaving their
heads) are popularly assumed to be religious; everyone
else is assumed to be a tourist. This conventional
wisdom is also reflected in how people identify, which
in turn reflects the Communist Party’s ambiguous
relationship with religion.
According to government statistics, the total number of
religious believers in China is 144 million,
approximately ten percent of the population. However,
this figure accounts only for people who either have a
formal affiliation with a church, mosque, or temple, or
self-identify with religious institutions or associations
of the five officially recognised faiths (Buddhism,
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Islam, Daoism, Protestant
Christianity, and
Catholicism). A much larger number of people engage
in occasional religious practices without formal
affiliation. In addition, folk practices (minjian xinyang)
such as ancestor worship and lineage temples have
been revived, particularly in rural areas, while fringe
groups
and
various
practices
deemed
‘superstitions’ (mixin) are closely watched, controlled,
and usually suppressed (Yao, 2007:173). This
especially applies to activities labeled as feudal
superstitions (fengjian mixin), which the CCP defines
as social practices that involve a medium or formal
social
network,
as
opposed
to
‘common
superstitions’ (yiban mixin), another term for folk
practices.
Both social science research and popular media reports
suggest that a much broader part of the population
practices religion to some extent, particularly
Buddhism, than official statistics show (see Chau,
2011). For example, drawing on survey data collected
in six Chinese cities in 1995 and 2005, Yao (2007)
reports that only a small percentage of respondents
(3.6% in 1995, 5.3% in 2005) self-identified as
religious (Yao, 2007:174). Yet, a majority of those
surveyed in 1995 believed in fate and fortune (57.7%),
and a similar number engaged in religious practices
such as burning paper money and worshipping
ancestors (53.9%). In the 2005 survey, while just 2.6%
of respondents identified as Buddhists, 14.8% of all
respondents kept an image of Buddha at home, 23.1%
had worshipped at a Buddhist temple in the previous
year, and 77.2% agreed with the fundamental Buddhist
precept
that
‘goodness
will
have
good
recompense’ (Ibid:176-178). In other words, while
religion as an exclusive or primary identity marker is
quite low among Han Chinese, religious practice,
especially Buddhism, is increasingly important and
common, as seen in activities of visitors to Wutai Shan.
These data illustrate how improved living standards
and increased incomes have not led to a decline in
religious practice. But, nor does this demonstrate a
religious revival. Some researchers have suggested that
a turn to spirituality and religion reflects a popular
desire for something to believe in after the CCP
repudiation of Maoism, or as a coping mechanism in
the face of rapid change in everyday life brought about
by large-scale modernisation. While this is certainly
plausible, pragmatic utilitarian reasons should not be
overlooked (Lai, 2003; Yao, 2007). Buddhism in
particular is much more visible in today’s China, but
not, at least for most practitioners, as a vehicle for
spiritual salvation or as an escape from materialism.
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Instead, it serves is a means of accentuating material
wealth, gaining or maintaining health, or achieving
specific goals.
This is illustrated by the most common Chinese
translation of the English word, ‘worship,’ bai. Unlike
‘worship,’ bai is used specifically to describe acts of
venerating the Buddha, for example by burning incense
and ritually bowing. This is different than intercessory
‘praying,’ usually associated with the Abrahamic
religions and translated as qidao, ‘to entreat or beg.’
Thus, while acts of piety at Buddhist temples are
described as ‘worshipping Buddha,’ the actual
intentions of practitioners may not be what nonChinese speakers usually associate with the piety of,
for example, Christian and Muslim worshipers. In
addition, and as noted above, identifying as a Buddhist,
Daoist, Christian, Muslim, or Catholic implies formal
membership in a congregation or community. Thus the
official data that appear to show that very few Chinese
citizens are religious, in reality demonstrates that
relatively few people identify as members of placebased religious communities. The pragmatic and
situational practice of Buddhism and Daoism is
widespread.
The reshaping of religious sites such as Wutai Shan
into tourist and heritage destinations is a continuation
of previous Party and State efforts to control religious
practice. Both under Mao and during the ongoing
reform period, major religious sites have not been
destroyed. Even at the height of Maoist radicalism, the
Party did not advocate a deliberate policy of physical
destruction of religious sites. Instead, temples,
churches and mosques were turned into schools,
warehouses, and other public facilities, reflecting the
utilitarian aspects of communism-in-practice. From the
village level up through all layers of society, the PartyState appropriated religious space for educational and
recreational purposes (Anagnost, 1994:221). Until
recently, one could argue that state officials sought to
cleanse these religious spaces of ritualised faith,
defined in the language of the Party as feudal
(fengjian) and superstitious (mixin), and transform
them into healthy spaces (Ibid:222). Yet an
examination of the religious economy of Wutai Shan
demonstrates quite the opposite. The State and Party
no longer seek to eradicate faith by banning its practice
and seizing control of sacred space. Instead, it now
seeks to manage faith through reshaping sacred places
into heritage sites.
In Wutai National Park this takes various forms, from
surveillance of monastic communities and registration
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of monks and nuns (who in turn receive monthly
stipends) to signage aimed at local residents that
prescribes how they should act within the park
(Shepherd, 2013). But, the most important effect of this
state management effort is the radical remaking of
space within the recently designated park core zone.
Private homes, shops, and guesthouses in the village of
Taihuai have been destroyed and farmland turned into
green park space as part of the official management
plan. With the approval of UNESCO, a majority of
secular residents will eventually be relocated to a
newly built satellite community outside the park’s
south gate. Far from leading to the commercialisation
of the sacred, heritage preservation (and by extension
tourism) has in this case had a very different effect.
What is called in Chinese the renao (‘hot and noisy’)
thick realities of Buddhism-in-practice is gradually
being eradicated, replaced by a preserved zone that
resembles the transnational park space of UNESCO
world heritage guidelines.

Managed Faith
Wutai Shan is a world heritage site primarily visited by
a particular type of tourist: residents of societies in
which Buddhism has had a foundational role in identity
formation for centuries. The vast majority of these
visitors are Han Chinese, largely domestic but
including members of the Chinese Diaspora. This
illustrates the resurgent role of Mahayana and Tibetan
Buddhism, both as faith and as cultural phenomenon,
in China over the last two decades, especially in urban
areas. As residents have grappled with a radical
transformation of lived experiences, ranging from
officially approved as well as unofficially tolerated
personal values, to choices in jobs, education, housing,
and even personal relationships, religious practices
have gained in popularity (Kleinman, 2010). However,
this renewed interest is easily overlooked if religious
identity is conflated with religious practice. While Han
Chinese increasingly identify with having (situational)
faith (you xinyang) they are much less likely to
foreground possessing religion (shi zongjiao) as a key
part of their lives.
If most of these Han Chinese visitors to Wutai Shan
have worship intentions, are they therefore on a
pilgrimage? Relative to the total number of visitors,
few participate in formal pilgrimage circuits to the five
peaks and designated sites along the way. Some
tourists cover these routes by car or commercial tour
bus, or spend a few days in a monastery guesthouse,
either alone or with family or friends. A few, wealthy
individuals fund private prayer services through
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generous donations, or purchase the counsel of eminent
monks. Most tourists arrive by car or tour bus and stay
for two or three days. They tour the major sites in
groups led by state-licensed guides, and in the
evenings eat, drink, or visit cultural performances such
as Shanxi Opera. However, what links all of these
different forms of practice is the central role of baifo:
venerating the Buddha. While not necessarily
identifying as either pilgrims or religious adherents,
Han Chinese tourists engage in pilgrimage-like
religious activities. In doing so they confront a statedirected effort to manage their experiences, an effort
ironically sanctioned by UNESCO’s modernist vision
of how world heritage should look.
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